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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
Of' THE STATE OF UTAH 
K HALVORSON, INC., and 




TIUXrnORE L. vVILLIAMS, 
arnl THE INDUSTRIAL 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was a proceeding under the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act wherein the defendant, Theodore L. 
Williams, was awarded permanent total disability as 
:lgainst the plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
rrhe Industrial Commission heard evidence on the 
rlf't\.,11dant's rlaim and awarded against the plaintiffs 
the maximum allowed for a permanent total disability. 
1 
RJ;~LIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This case is before this Court on a \Vrit of C0rtio-
rari. The p1aintiff seeks a reversal of the Order of the 
Industrial Commission and a determination requiri11g 
the Commission to have a medical panel appointed pur-
suant to the requirements of 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Theodore L. \Villiams, on Odobt'r 
13, 1964, vrns injured during the course of his employ-
ment with Halvorson Construction Co. The defernlant 
experienced a 20-foot fall which resulted in a bilateral 
ankle fracture, as well as a fracture of the lumbar Ycr-
tebrae. (T12) Subsequent to the defendant's admissio11 
to the hospital, the defendant experienced extreme car-
dial vascular insufficiency. It was supposed that he snf-
fered from an acute myrocardial infarction. (T2) 'I'he 
plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, paid the defernl-
ant 's hospitalization and medical bi11s, and on Octolwr 
15, 1965, an application was filed for a physical exami-
nation by the Medical Advisory Board. (T22) On No-
vember 20, 1965, the defendant, Theodore L. \Villiam~. 
appeared before the Meclica1 Ackisonr Board to <lrtt>r-
mine the permanent disability caused by 1111• injnr~- of 
October 13, 1964. The Board found 50% loss of ho<lil~­
function due to muscu1ar-ske1etal injnries. Hmw·,·er. ii 
did not make a finding as to permanent disability rati1w 
in regard to the defendant's cardiac and pulrnorn1r.1 
status and its relationship to tlw accid011t. (T 27) 
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On December 3, 1965, the Commission notified Mr. 
Williams that The State Insurance Fund was liable for 
permanent disability amounting to 50% loss of bodily 
fnndion arnl informed him that a special board would 
Ji(• appointed by the Commission to evaluate the cardiac 
<1Jl(1 pulmonary problems. Dr. Vikel, chairman of the 
m·wl:-T designated panel, asked Dr. F. Clyde Null, a treat-
i11~ pl1ysician, to evaluate for the panel the medical as-
1wcts of the ease in regard to the heart, lung and kidney. 
Pursuant to said request, Dr. Null filed a report (T 35-39, 
i11elnsive) wherein he concluded that the patient's pul-
monary disease is unrelated to the ankle injury and ante-
ilatcd the accident and the recent period of hospitaliza-
tion. (T39) The doctor also noted in his report that the 
patie11t had similar chest pains in 1955, and was treated 
hy the Veterans Administration Hospital for bronchitis. 
On February 1, 1966, the panel filed its report (T41). 
The medical panel, after reviewing the history of 
the clef endant, Williams, made a finding that the myro-
eardial infarction plus the kidney difficulties were caus-
all~r related to the accident in question. They stated that 
~Ir. vYilliams had had a long standing chronic obstruc-
t iY0 airway disease and emphysema. The panel made the 
following statement: 
''The panel finds that Mr. Williams has severe, 
C'hronic pulmonary disease which in itself would 
he sufficient reason for total and permanent disa-
hilitv. To this is added, the panel finds, chronic 
C'Hr(iiac disease as evidenced by angina which 
would be a 10%-20% additional cause of disabil-
it~r. These disabilities from pulmonary and car-
diac diseases are, of course, in addition to his 
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orthopedic disabilities which have been previous-
ly rated by the Medical Advisory Board.'' 
Thus, the medical panel found that the defendant 
had a long-standing pre-existing problem; further, that 
the accident precipitated certain events which would 
make the pulmonary disease, standing by itself, totally 
and permanently disabling. Then the panel added 10%-
20% additional disability. Within the time provided, 
The State Insurance Fund objected to the medical panrl 
report and stated in its objection that the same was mad0 
"for the purpose of clarification of permanent partial 
disability relating specifically to the industrial accidrnt 
of October 13, 1964." (T66) The position of The Rtatr 
Insurance Fund was further amplified in a subsequrllt 
letter dated March 10, 1966, wherein The State Insur-
ance Fund stated that the amount assigned appeared io 
be an additional 10% - 20% and wanted a clarification 
as to its liability. This confusion was felt by the defend-
ant's attorney in his letter of April 13, 1966, wherein he 
wrote requesting a hearing so that the applicant may 
be found 100% totally and permanently disabled. (Ti2) 
At the onset of the hearing, the plaintiff clearly state(] 
the dilemma with which it was faced in determining the 
rating the panel has assigned. (T76-77) 
Dr. Crockett testified at the hearing on .T Ull(' rn. 
1966, on behalf of the medical panel. The doctor testi-
fied in substance as follows: The defondant-applicallt 
had been under treatment for angina pains and for pul-
monary problems and chronic bronchitis at the Vrkr 
ans Administration prior to thr acci<1cnt in qucstio11. 
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Th(' panel did not make a determination as to the per-
(·<•11tage of disability attributable to the pre-existing 
disease and further stated that they had insufficient in-
formation on "'hich to arrive at the determination of the 
pnlrnonar:v disability prior to the injury. It was ad-
mit tc>d, however, that the defendant had a serious pre-
('Xisting condition. The medical history of the defend-
:rnt-applicant showed that disability rating had been 
assigi1Crl by the Veterans Administration as a result of 
the prior condition; however, the panel was unsure what 
snid rating was. On cross-examination the doctor stated 
that he did not have an opinion as to the defendant's dis-
nhility prior to the accident in question and could not 
<'Hll state whether or not it was less or more than 5%. It 
was explained that the medical panel's report which stat-
P<1 that the applicant was 10% - 20% additionally dis-
aliled was in addition to his pulmonary problem which 
renderPd him, in and of itself, permanently disabled. It 
was admitted that the panel report in regard to percent-
agt> of disability was ambiguous and that it was the doc-
tor's hope that the same could be clarified at the time of 
the hearing. 
After the hearing, the plaintiffs objected to the pro-
cedure followed by the Industrial Commission. The plain-
tiffs specifically asked that this matter be referred to 
n rni,cliral panel pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-69 
F< '.A. 195B, as amended, and stated in its Motion that 
llw plaintiffs could not understand the position of the 
medirnl panel until the same was clarified by Dr. Crock-
Ptt. Notwithstanding the above, the Commission made 
<111 Ord<>r dated August 11, 1966, which assessed liability 
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for 100% disability to the plaintiff, The State Insur-
ance Fund, and stated that the plaintiff had been mis-
led as to the effect of Section 35-1-69 U.C.A. Hl53, as 
amended. The plaintiff filed a Motion for Review and 
set forth six bases as to why the Commission acted with-




THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING 
TO REFER THIS MATTER TO A MEDI-
CAL PANEL TO DETERMINE THE PER-
CENTAGE OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL 
IMPAIRMENT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY AND TO THE PRE 
VIOUSLY EXISTING CONDITION. 
The issues presented by this appeal does not in-
volve the question of whether or not the Industrial Com-
mission acted arbitrary and capricious in making its 
:findings. For the purpose of this argument the def emlant 
does not object to the :finding of the Commission that the 
defendant-applicant is 100% totally and permanently dis-
abled. The issues presented her2 are whether or not 
the Commission erred in failing to comply with Section 
35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, under the circumstances 
of this case. It is fundamental, and this Court has stated, 
that the Commission's decision will he reversed if said 
decision is based upon a misapplication of law. '!'hr 
State Insurance Com111iss1:on of Utah v. The Ii11l11sl rial 
Commission of Utah, 395 P. 2d 541, 16 U. 2d 50. lt i:.; 
elementary that on review this Court "-ill not distnrli 
disputed findings of faet made by the Commission, but 
will re;'iew errors of law. 
It seems clear that in this case, Section 35-1-69 
U .C.A. l 953, as amended, applies. This statute pro-
\'ides that if an employee who has previously in-
curred a permanent incapacity prior to the acciden-
tal injury, which results in permanent incapacity 
which is greater than he would have had if the pre-exist-
ing incapacity was not present, he shall be awarded bene-
fitR hased upon the combined injuries; however, ''the lia-
bility of the employer for such compensation and medical 
care shall be for the industrial injury only and the re-
mainder shall be paid out of the special fund ... " If 
the above circumstances exist, then the statute specifi-
1.:ally requires that the matter be sent to a medical panel, 
which must make three determinations: 
1. The total permanent physical impairment result-
ing from all causes and conditions, including the indus-
trial injury (which was accomplished by the medical 
panel report). ( T41) 
2. 'rhe percentage of permanent physical impair-
m<>nt nttributable to the industrial injury. (This was not 
aceomplished by the medical panel.) 
3. 'fhe percentage of permanent physical impairment 
a1 trihutable to the previously existing conditions, wheth-
('\' dnc to accidental injury, disease or congenital causes. 
( Tl1t• mt>dical panel admittedly did not examine into this 
'J lll':-;1 ion.) 
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There is no doubt that Mr. Williams had a long-
standing history of pulmonary problems which precipi-
tated a disability rating by the Veterans Administration. 
The panel report is admittedly ambiguous, which 
fact is evidenced by the plaintiff's attorney's letter, 
the doctor's statement, the hearing examiner's state-
ment and by an examination of the report. After the 
matter was "clarified" at the hearing in question, the 
plaintiff timely requested The Industrial Commission 
to comply with 35-1-69, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
There can be no reasonable basis on which to deny 
the plaintiff the right to the appointment of a medical 
panel to determine the percentage of disability attribu-
table to the pre-existing condition and to assess the lia-
bility for such disability to the special fund. Dr. Kil-
patrick testified in this matter in regard to the pre-exist-
ing condition and states as follows: (TSO) 
'' Q. But there is no doubt there was a serious 
pre-existing condition 1 
A. There is no doubt about that. 
Q. Can you describe the condition that he had 
prior to the injury, to the best of your recollec-
tion 1 
A. He had emphysema and chronic bronchitis. 
Q. And what do you mean by 'emphysema'7 
A. This is an over-distention of the little al-
veoli, or the little compartments of the lung'. ~o 
that the lung is larger than normal, and the air 
can't get in and out as readily as the normal lnug. 
Q. At this type of condition - I think it is a 
condition, rather than a disemw, isn't it? 
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A. It's a disease. 
Q. It's a disease7 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. This type of disease can have a material 
effect on the heart, can it not 1 
A. Yes. After it gets severe enough, it can 
affect the heart. 
Q. And generally isn't this disease a devel-
oping type of situation? 
A. Over many years.'' 
It is clear that the 100% rating was based not only 
on the accident but upon the pre-existing condition, ac-
cording to the doctor's testimony. (T 81-82) 
'' Q. In other words your 10 to 20% was taken 
into consideration as if he would not have had 
this pre-existing condition? 
A. Correct. 
Q. With the pre-existing condition, he was 
100%7 
Q. With the pre-existing condition, in the 
condition of his lungs at the time that we exam-
ined him - or we saw him, and went over his rec-
ords - he was 100% disabled pulmonary wise." 
It is also clear from the record that the medical 
panel was not instructed of, nor did it determine, the per-
rentage of disability due to the pre-existing condition, 
as follows: (T88) 
"Q. WonJCT it be a fair statement to say that 
yon had insufficient evidence then to arrive at a 
<lisability evaluation prior to his injury7 
A. That is correct. I had no evidence for disa-
bility prior to his injury. 
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Q. But you kne1v there was some? 
A. I knew that he had pulmonary emphysema 
and chronic bronchitis, due to his history. Due to 
the Veterans' Hospital records." 
POINT II 
THE COl\HIISSION ERRED IN ITS INTF,R_ 
PRETATION AND DESCRIPTION OF 'rHE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 35-1-69 U.C.A. 
1953, AS AMENDED. 
The Commission's Order on file herein does llot 
comply with 35-1-85 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, in setting 
forth :findings of fact and conclusions of law. Howen~r, 
it appears clear that the Commission held that Sectio11 
35-1-69 U.C.A., as amended, does not apply to this par-
ticular case. The Commission's reasoning, it is respect-
fully suggested, is clearly erroneous. The Order state~ 
that the section in question was substantially changed in 
the year 1965. This is not the fact of the matter. Thr 
section was, however, substantially changed by the l96:l 
Legislature. Prior thereto, the statute in question spoke 
about an employee being "permanently partially dis-
abled." This wording has been replaced by the phrase 
"permanent incapacity." Also, the second paragrapl1 
of the existing statute was added, which provided for a 
determination of certain facts by a medical panel. It i~ 
agreed that the Commission's statement, that the amend-
ment has the effect of relieving the employer from a~ 
suming liability for an injury aggravated by pre-existing 
disabilities and, as amended, the special fund is liah1r 
for tlw percentage of permanent incapacity attrilrntahlr 
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to the pre-existing condition, is correct. Prior to the 1963 
mnen<lment, the "special fund" was only liable when 
tl1rre was a previous permanent partial disability. The 
phrase "permanent partial disability" is used in the 
Workmen's Compensation Act in those situations where 
a rating has occurred. Thus, the legislative amendment, 
hy :mbstituting the phrase'' a permanent incapacity by ae-
eid<·ntal injury, disease or congenital cases" clearly 
men ns that the second injury or the "special fund" is 
liable for that percentage of physical impairment at-
tributed to such previously existing accidental injury, 
di:wnse or congenital causes. In light of the addition of 
thr requirements of a special medical panel to determine 
tl1r percentage of disability, it is apparent that it is the 
<lnty of the Industrial Commission to instruct the medi-
c·11 I 1rnnel to arrive at such percentage. The only amend-
ment in 1965 was the dollar amount, increasing the same 
from $735 to $830 for rehabilitation. 
Initially, the Commission held that 35-1-69 U.C.A. 
1!1:>:1, as amended, was not applicable because the in-
jnry occurred on October 13, 1965, and the effective date 
of the legislation was July, 1965. The Commission, sub-
S<·quent thereto, amended its Order and found that the 
injnry O<'cnrrecl on October 13, 1964. One is at a loss 
to tlrtermine what the Commission meant when it re-
f'1'l'l'<><l to the fact that the statute is not applicable be-
<«111:-;e there would be retroactive legislation and it 
would he unconstitutional. If the Commission was re-
h·rring- to the injury of October 13, 1964, the Com-
r11i,:-:io11 i:-; mistaken in its assumption that the amend-
•111·11t occurred in 1965. In fact, as stated above, the 
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amendment was passed in 1963. Therefore, under thi:; 
theory, the section is dearly applicahle. If, howeYer, 
the Commission's Order may be construed to hold that 
"permanent incapacity" must have occurred prior to 
the effective date of the legislation, it is respectfully 
urged that the Commission has misinterpreted the dear 
legislative intent of the statute. For the Legislature, in 
stating ''one who has previously incurred permanent in-
capacity," sets no limits as to time. This question lm 
been decided in Utah in Marker v. Industrial Commis. 
sion, 84 U. 587, 37 P. 2d 785. This case involved a sit-
uation where an employee had previously incurred per-
manent partial disability prior to the enactment of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act and, pursuant to the spr-
cial injury fund, brought an action for combined in-
juries. The defense raised was that the permanent 
partial disability must have occurred subsequent to thr 
enactment of the statute. The Court held that the Leg-
islature, in imposing no limitation or condition as tn 
time or place of the occurring of the previous disability, 
clearly meant that the prior disability must not have 
occurred subsequent to the enactment of the statute. 
POINT III 
THE COl\fMISSION ERRED IN ADOPTING 
THE MEDICAL PANEL REPORT ON FILE 
HEREIN. 
Subsequent to the filing of the medical panel re-
port, the plaintiff, pursuant to 35-1-77, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, objected to said report. Once written ohjer-
tions are so fik•d, acco]'(ling- to the statute, npon a hear-
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ing '' ... the written report of the panel may be received 
as an exhibit but shall not be considered as evidence in 
the case, except insofar as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted.'' 
Since the panel report was ambiguous and the same 
nreded clarification by the doctor's further testimony, 
the same could not be the basis for an award since the 
testimony of Dr. Crockett did not sustain the medical 
panel report but rather by amplifying the same changed 
tlw meaning of the report. See Hackford v. Industrial 
Commission, 358 P. 2d 899, 11U.2d312. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission erred in failing to provide that 
the medical panel should assess the permanent inca-
pat'i ty of the defendant and charge the same to the spe-
cial fund pursuant to 35-1-69 U.C.A. 1953, as amended. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
422 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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